

1 Anthony J. Ellrod (State Bar No. 136574)
 2 aje@manningllp.com
 3 Natalya Vasyuk (State Bar No. 307419)
 4 ndv@manningllp.com
 5 **MANNING & KASS**
 6 **ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP**
 7 801 S. Figueroa St, 15th Floor
 8 Los Angeles, California 90017-3012
 9 Telephone: (213) 624-6900
 10 Facsimile: (213) 624-6999
 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff WILLIAM JAMES MITCHELL

8 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
 9 **COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT**

MANNING & KASS
 ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP
 ATTORNEYS AT LAW

12 WILLIAM JAMES MITCHELL,
 13 Plaintiff,
 14 v.
 15 TWIN GALAXIES, LLC,
 16 Defendant.

Case No. 19STCV12592
 [The Hon. WENDY CHANG DEPT. 36]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
 AND MOTION FOR COSTS AND
 ATTORNEY FEES JOINTLY AND
 SEVERALLY AGAINST DEFENDANTS
 AND THEIR COUNSEL;
 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
 AUTHORITIES**

DATE: April 5, 2022
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
PLACE: Dept. 36

Reservation ID: 930998964344

Action Filed: 4/11/2019
 Trial: Not set yet

22 **TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

23 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on April 5, 2022, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
 24 the matter may be heard, in Department 36 of the above-captioned Court, located at 111 N. Hill
 25 Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff WILLIAM JAMES MITCHELL will move the court for
 26 an award of reasonable costs and attorney's fees under CCP § 425.16 (c)(1).

27 Under CCP § 425.16 (c)(1), the Court may award reasonable costs and attorney's fees to the
 28 prevailing plaintiff on an anti-SLAPP motion. "If the court finds that a special motion to strike is

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to [California Rules of Civil Procedure] Section 128.5.” (CCP § 425.16 (c)(1).)

Plaintiff requests that Defendant TWIN GALAXIES, LLC and its counsel David A. Tashroudian and Tashroudian Law Group be held jointly and severally liable for paying Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs in the lodestar amount of \$203,945 in attorney’s fees, plus a .50 multiplier of \$21,480, plus \$598.96 in costs, for a total award and judgment of \$226,014.96.

This Motion consists of: (1) this Notice of Motion, (2) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, (3) the Declaration of Anthony J. Ellrod, and such other documents, evidence, and arguments that the Court may accept at the hearing on this motion.

DATED: February 8, 2022

MANNING & KASS
ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP

By: 

Anthony J. Ellrod
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
WILLIAM JAMES MITCHELL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1	
2	
3 I. Factual and Procedural History	8
4 III. Under the Lodestar Method, Plaintiff May Recover The Reasonable Market Value for Attorneys' Services.....	14
5 IV. The Declaration of Counsel is Sufficient Evidence	15
6 V. PLAINTIFF'S' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW	17
7	
8 VI. Defendant and Their Counsel are Jointly and Severally Liable.....	19
9 VII. CONCLUSION	22
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Blackburn v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc.
2012 WL 1067632, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24) 15

Graham-Sult v. Clainos
(2014) 756 F.3d at 751 18

Hill v. Berryhill
2018 WL 4039912, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018) 18

In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.
2015 WL 5158730, at 9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015)..... 19

Masimo Corp v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P.
2007 WL 5279897 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007) 19

Max Sound Corp. v. Google, Inc.
2017 WL 4536342, at 12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) 18

Metabolife Intern., Inc. v. Wornick
(2002) 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220..... 18

Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc.
2017 WL 2423161, at 9 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2017) 19

Open Source Security, Inc. v. Perens
2018 WL 2762637, at 7 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2018) 18

ScriptsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Global LLC
2016 WL 6871280, at 5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016)..... 19

Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Univ. Remote Control, Inc.
130 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1337 (C.D. Cal. 2015)..... 18

Wynn v. Chanos
2015 WL 3832561, at 2 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2015) 19

STATE CASES

Balla v. Hall
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652..... 11

Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp.
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454..... 10

Chacon v. Litke
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234..... 15

MANNING & KASS
ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

1	<i>Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim</i> (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628.....	15, 18
2	<i>Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc.</i>	
	(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1382.....	9
3		
	<i>Doe v. Luster</i>	
4	(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139.....	9, 10
5	<i>Dove Audio v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman</i> (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777	15
6	<i>Evans v. Unkow</i>	
	(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490.....	10
7		
	<i>Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi</i>	
8	(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1375.....	9
9	<i>Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP</i> (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435	10
10	<i>Grewal v. Jammu</i>	
	(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977.....	17
11		
	<i>Ketchum v. Moses</i>	
12	(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122	15, 16
13	<i>L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. the Independent Taxi Owners Assn. of Los Angles</i>	
	(2019) 239 Cal.App.4th 918.....	9
14		
	<i>Martino v. Denevi</i>	
15	(1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553.....	15
16	<i>Moore v. Shaw</i>	
	(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182.....	10
17		
	<i>Moriarty v. Laramar Management Corp.</i>	
18	(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 125.....	14
19	<i>Navellier v. Sletten</i>	
	(2002) 29 Cal.4th 82.....	10
20		
	<i>Nemecek & Cole v. Horn</i>	
21	208 Cal.App.4th at 652	15
22	<i>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</i>	
	(1964) 376 U.S. 254	11
23		
	<i>Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass'n</i>	
24	163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 561 (2008).....	18
25	<i>Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court</i>	
	(1984) 37 Cal.3d 244.....	11
26		
	<i>Rusheen v. Cohern</i>	
27	(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048.....	10
28		

1	<i>Serrano III</i>	
2	<i>supra</i> , 20 Cal. 3d at p. 49.	16
3	<i>Serrano IV</i>	
4	<i>supra</i> , 32 Cal. 3d at p. 625	16
5	<i>Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif</i>	
6	(2006) 39 Cal.4th 260.....	11
7	<i>Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co.</i>	
8	(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285.....	15
9	<i>Syers Properties III v. Rankin</i>	
10	(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691.....	14
11	<i>Vargas v. City of Salinas</i>	
12	(2011) 200 Cal. App. 4th 1331.....	18
13	<i>Zamos v. Stroud</i>	
14	(2004) 32 Cal.4th 958.....	11
15	<u>STATUTES</u>	
16	Cal. Civ. Pro. Sec. 425.16(c)(1)	9, 10, 19, 21
17	Cal.Civ. Pro. Sec. 128.5	9, 19
18	CCP §§ 2031.310 and 2023.010.....	20
19	CCP §§ 396b (b), 2023.010, 2031.310.....	19, 20
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1
2 Plaintiff William J. Mitchell submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities
3 under sections 425.16(c)(1) and 128.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, as the prevailing
4 plaintiff on a special motion to strike under the strategic lawsuits against public participation statute
5 (anti-SLAPP). Plaintiff seeks a lodestar amount of \$203,945 in attorney’s fees, plus a .50 multiplier
6 of \$21,480, plus \$598.96 in costs, for a total award and judgment of \$226,014.96. These fees were
7 solely incurred in responding to defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and appeal; these fees were
8 incurred while researching, drafting briefs, gathering and reviewing evidence, arguing the anti-
9 SLAPP motion, preparing the appellate response, preparing an answer to a petition for review, and
10 preparing this motion for attorney’s fees. (See generally Ellrod Decl.) The request for attorney’s
11 fees is based on 356.5 hours of billable time (this includes 10 hours of anticipated time for a review
12 of the opposition to this motion and preparation of a reply) at a blended market rate of \$600 per hour
13 per attorney and \$250 per hour for a paralegal, which are reasonable rates for a downtown Los
14 Angeles law firm. Attorneys at Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester worked on the anti-
15 SLAPP motion, the appeal, the petition for review, and this attorney’s fee motion: senior partner
16 Anthony J. Ellrod, partner James Gibbons, partner Steven Renick, of Counsel Trisha Newman,
17 Associate Natalya Vasyuk, Associate Chelsea Clayton, and paralegal Elaine G. Berman. (See
18 generally, Ellrod Decl.)

19 The fees in this case were higher than average because defense counsel included voluminous
20 exhibits and declarations, including improperly filing new evidence to support their reply to
21 plaintiff’s opposition, necessitating substantial document review as well as a sur-reply from
22 plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff was forced to file an appellate respondent’s brief, and an answer to
23 petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Because an anti-SLAPP motion involves both
24 a Demurrer component and a Summary Judgment component, Plaintiff’s counsel was required to
25 obtain and produce evidence and research to rebut defendant’s evidence and arguments. Defendant
26 filed a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion, elected to appeal that denial, and then seek further review
27 (which was summarily denied).

28 Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was utterly meritless, however after the court denied it

1 defendant appealed. After Defendant filed several extensions of time in the court of appeal, the
2 briefing ultimately rehashed the same unmeritorious arguments focusing on attempting to have their
3 own evidence as the sole basis for the decision in their opening brief, just as had been done in the
4 original motion, in direct contravention to well established law. That Defendant requested
5 extensions and then ultimately filed an appeal that mirrored the pleadings in the trial court supports
6 the conclusion that the motion, the appeal, and the request for review were intended to delay.
7 Defendant and his counsel have no one to blame but themselves if these costs are considered high.
8 In addition, despite the delays on appeal, Defendant would not agree to release the undertaking while
9 defendant's appellant's briefing was pending.

10 Under CCP sec. 425.16(c)(1), a finding of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion as frivolous or
11 for purpose of delay, makes an award of fees to the prevailing plaintiff mandatory. As defendant's
12 motion and subsequent seek of review were both frivolous and for the purpose of delay, and plaintiff
13 having prevailed at both the trial and appellate level, plaintiff respectfully requests the court award
14 attorney fees and costs in the total amount of \$226,014.96.

15 **I. Factual and Procedural History**

16 On April 11, 2019, Mitchell filed this lawsuit against Twin Galaxies and filed a First
17 Amended Complaint on March 12, 2020, set out in two causes of action: i) Defamation and ii)
18 False Light. This lawsuit stemmed from Twin Galaxies' public statements on April 12, 2018, that
19 Mitchell had achieved his long-standing world record video game scores by cheating. It stripped
20 him of those records and banned him for life from submitting further records, as punishment.
21 These statements were further published through Twin Galaxies's social media channels. Twin
22 Galaxies statements resulted in articles in major news outlets such as *the New York Times*, *The*
23 *Washington Post*, and *Variety*. In addition, in reliance on Twin Galaxies statements, William's
24 video game records were removed from the Guinness Book of World Records. These records have
25 since been reinstated by the Guinness Book of World Records, once it had been presented with
26 evidence of William's legitimately earned video game scores.

27 On March 30, 2020, Twin Galaxies filed a special motion to strike under anti-SLAPP,
28 essentially staying the litigation. After the anti-SLAPP motion was filed and pending ruling, on

1 September 22, 2020, defendants filed a motion for undertaking pursuant to California Code of
2 Civil Procedure section 1030(a). On October 26, 2020, the court denied defendant’s anti-SLAPP
3 motion and granted the motion for undertaking. On November 13, 2020, defendants filed a notice
4 of appeal on the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, resulting in litigation being further stayed in the
5 trial court.

6 On December 3, 2020, plaintiff posted a substantial undertaking of \$81,225. On December
7 4, 2020, the court sent a notice of default to defendants for not filing a Case Information
8 Statement. A briefing schedule for the appeal was then set.

9 Defendant filed three extensions of time on the opening brief: from January 28, 2021, to
10 March 1, 2021, to April 1, 2021, and finally to April 8, 2021, respectively. Plaintiff opposed the
11 third extension, indicating the financial harm of prolonging the appeal considering the economic
12 disruptions of COVID-19 and defendant’s refusal to agree to release the undertaking in light of
13 these delays.

14 The court of appeal issued a published opinion affirming the denial of the motion on
15 October 12, 2021, almost a full year after the ruling in the trial court on the anti-SLAPP motion
16 and ten months since the posting of undertaking. Defendant then filed a petition for review in the
17 California Supreme Court, to which plaintiff filed an answer. The Petition for review was
18 summarily denied on January 26, 2022. Remittitur on the appeal was issued on January 31, 2022.

19 **II. Attorney Fees May Be Awarded to a Prevailing Plaintiff on an Anti-SLAPP Motion**

20 A prevailing plaintiff on an anti-SLAPP motion may be awarded costs and attorney fees
21 pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. Sec. 425.16(c)(1), if the courts finds that a defendant’s special motion to
22 strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. Costs and fees are awarded
23 pursuant to the substantive standards established under Cal.Civ. Pro. Sec. 128.5. (*Ibid.*; *see also*
24 *Doe v. Luster* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 143; *Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc.* (2003) 105
25 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1292.) “[I]f a [special] motion [to strike] is determined to be frivolous, an
26 award of attorney fees is mandatory.” (*L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. the Independent Taxi Owners*
27 *Assn. of Los Angeles* (2019) 239 Cal.App.4th 918, 932; *Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer*
28 *Rights v. Garamendi* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388.) “Frivolous in this context means that

1 any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit.” (*Gerbosi v.*
2 *Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 450.)

3 “‘[A] court must use the procedures and apply the substantive standards of section 128.5 in
4 deciding whether to award attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citation.] Attorney fees
5 under section 128.5 may be assessed against a party, the party’s attorney, or both.” (*Moore v.*
6 *Shaw* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 199 citing sec. 128.5 subd. (a).)

7 A plaintiff prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion and any subsequent appeal, may file a
8 timely motion for attorney fees any time prior to final entry of judgment. (*Carpenter v. Jack in the*
9 *Box Corp.* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461, 468.) A prevailing party under 425.16 may move for
10 attorney fees by a separate, subsequently filed motion after the costs incurred can be determined.
11 (*Doe v. Luster, supra*, 145 Cal.App.4th at 144.) “Under section 425.16, subdivision (c),
12 ‘[a]ppellate challenges concerning the [special] motion to strike are also subject to an award of
13 fees and costs, which are determined by the trial court after the appeal is resolved.’” (*L.A. Taxi*
14 *Cooperative, Inc., supra*, at 933, citing *Christian Research Institute v. Alnor* (2008) 165
15 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) Cal. Civ. Pro. Sec. 425.16(c)(1) authorizes an award of attorney fees to
16 a prevailing party without limitation, and appellate attorney fees are also recoverable. (*See Evans*
17 *v. Unkow* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499-1500.)

18 Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was both frivolous and for the purpose of delay. An
19 award of attorneys’ fees and costs would be mandatory.

20 **A. Defendant’s Motion and Subsequent Appeal Were Frivolous**

21 To prevail on an anti-SLAP motion, a defendant must show that it was engaged in
22 statutorily protected activity, and that plaintiff could not establish a probability of success on the
23 causes of action. (*Rusheen v. Cohern* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056; *Navellier v. Sletten* (2002) 29
24 Cal.4th 82, 88.) The first prong was not at issue on either the motion or on appeal, leaving the
25 focus solely on whether plaintiff had shown a probability of success of prevailing on his claims.
26 This was a fact intensive analysis with a great deal of evidence produced by plaintiff.

27 To show a probability of success, plaintiff must present a legally sufficient claim,
28 supported by a prima facie showing of evidence to support a favorable judgment, should the

1 evidence submitted be credited. (*Zamos v. Stroud* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 965.) A court considers
2 everything submitted by both parties but does not weigh the evidence, and accepts as true the
3 evidence submitted by plaintiff to establish whether plaintiff has *minimal* merit to defeat the anti-
4 SLAPP motion. (*Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291). For
5 purposes of considering whether plaintiff could show a probability of success on claims of
6 defamation, if the plaintiff happens to be a public figure, it must be shown by clear and convincing
7 evidence that a false statement of fact was made with actual malice. (*Reader's Digest Assn. v.*
8 *Superior Court* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 256; *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* (1964) 376 U.S. 254,
9 285-286.) For false light, a plaintiff must establish the same requirements as they would a
10 defamation claim. (*Balla v. Hall* (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 657.)

11 Plaintiff easily met the minimal threshold required. Specifically, William's premier
12 evidence of falsity and actual malice – Twin Galaxies' willful refusal to interview key witnesses,
13 including its own referees who it had hired to verify plaintiff's records in the first place, and
14 defendant's disregard of Nintendo Senior Engineer Wayne Shirt, who verified the hardware the
15 game score was obtained on - clearly and easily met this minimal threshold of merit for an anti-
16 SLAPP motion. Anything beyond this was defendant's attempt to have the court ignore these
17 disputes of fact.

18 Further, in defendant's motion, it was argued that because Twin Galaxies began the
19 published conclusion of William's alleged cheating "We now believe..." that they were merely
20 stating opinion and not fact. This is disingenuous considering that defendants arguments also rely
21 upon their extensive investigation to support their 'findings' as not being false. This was clearly
22 more than their mere opinion. Defendant's claim to the contrary was meritless.

23 As pointed out in the ruling by the trial court "Considering the foregoing, a reasonable fact
24 finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of
25 fact...(Tr. Ct. Ruling, p. 14:2-3.) The trial court goes on to cite the extensive evidence provided
26 regarding facts submitted by plaintiff to support the claim of falsity. (*Ibid.* p. 14:19-15:7.)
27 Defendant had also offered evidence to contradict that evidence. (*Ibid.* p. 15:8-16.) This was at
28 best a dispute of fact which defendants were asking the court to rule on as a matter of law, in spite

1 of the legal standard prohibiting such an undertaking, and of which defendant’s counsel would be
2 aware. No reasonable attorney would ask the court to disregard well-established law.

3 In spite of the clearly established law that the court is not to weigh the evidence as fact
4 finder, defendant persisted attempting to do so on appeal. As stated in the appellate court
5 published opinion: “The parties submitted extensive evidence in connection with the anti-SLAPP
6 proceedings....it only serves to underscore our observation that there exist many factual disputes
7 which may not be resolved on review of an anti-SLAPP ruling.” (App. Opn. P. 11, [fn.2].)
8 Defendant in this case has attempted to use the anti-SLAPP procedure to circumvent plaintiff’s
9 right to be heard on his claims, despite the clear dispute of facts regarding malice, and falsity.

10 Further, defendant filed a petition for review claiming error in the appellate court for
11 considering circumstantial evidence, while pointing out that its own investigation was limited to
12 video tapes it reviewed. This evidence has repeatedly been pointed to as being challenged for
13 chain of custody and authenticity. Defendant has essentially stated that the appellate court has
14 committed error by reviewing plaintiff’s evidence, ignoring established law that this is the correct
15 method of review of anti-SLAPP evidence to establish probability of plaintiff’s success on the
16 claims.

17 As is clear in the evidence submitted on the anti-SLAPP motion, defendant did not care
18 what evidence William has. That in and of itself shows malice and supports the award of
19 attorneys’ fees. While defendant may not care, it is necessary for the trial court to take it into
20 consideration and to credit plaintiff’s evidence, and for an appellate court to also consider on
21 review, de novo. This is the required legal standard for an anti-SLAPP motion and its review. This
22 was clearly frivolous at both the trial and appellate level. Defendant then further filed a petition for
23 review, making these same types of arguments.

24 As can be seen, the voluminous evidence presented by plaintiff clearly demonstrates that at
25 the very least a factual dispute exists that defendant was simply trying to avoid by filing an anti-
26 SLAPP motion. In spite of established law that requires crediting plaintiff’s evidence for purposes
27 of decision and ruling, defendant persisted in making these unmeritorious arguments. No
28 reasonable attorney would find defendant’s motion meritorious, and therefore it is frivolous and

1 plaintiff is entitled to his fees.

2 **B. Defendant’s Motion and Subsequent Appeal Were for Delay**

3 In addition to being frivolous, defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, appeal and petition for
4 further review have been for delay. There are a number of clear instances that demonstrate
5 defendant’s use of the anti-SLAPP motion proceedings for delay: 1) new voluminous records filed
6 for the first time with defendant’s *reply* in support of its motion; 2) the timing of the filing of its
7 motion for undertaking; (3) the filing of an appeal; (4) the numerous requests by defendant for
8 extensions to file its opening brief; and (5) the petition for review to the California Supreme Court.

9 That there were clear unfair tactics being used by defendant can be seen in the breadth of
10 new evidence submitted by defendant in reply, all of which had been known at the time of filing
11 their initial motion. Indeed, all of the evidence improperly presented by defendant with its reply
12 was known to defendant even prior to initiation of the lawsuit. Plaintiff’s evidence shows that
13 defendant purposely avoided plaintiff’s evidence regarding the veracity of his scores, and
14 defendant then attempted to avoid the consequences of this lawsuit by providing evidence to the
15 court in a manner that would have made plaintiff unable to reply. It required plaintiff to then file a
16 sur-reply to answer all this new evidence, further delaying the motion on the merits, and incurring
17 more legal fees.

18 In addition to the attempt to prevent plaintiff from responding to defendant’s evidence
19 submitted with its reply, defendant filed a motion for undertaking for a substantial amount, after it
20 had filed its anti-SLAPP motion, but prior to the court ruling on it. The timing on this implies bad
21 faith tactics being taken by defense counsel. Notably, had defendant been successful on their anti-
22 SLAPP they would have been entitled to attorney’s fees at the time of ruling on the motion. No
23 motion for undertaking would have been necessary as the case would have been dismissed and
24 defendant could have sought their fees at that point. However, if defendant lost the motion, an
25 appeal would automatically stay the proceedings while the appeal was pending, forcing defendant
26 to deposit money up front for proceedings that would likely take the better part of a year to
27 conclude. These tactics were pointed out by plaintiff’s counsel in their opposition to the motion
28 for undertaking. The combination of plaintiff having to deposit a large amount of money, while

1 not being able to pursue his claims on the merits for the length of the appeal, and then for however
2 long thereafter the case will take in the trial court in order to actually reach the merits, was clearly
3 a strategy to make plaintiff’s continued pursuit of his claims so onerous that he might consider
4 foregoing his case because of the financial burden.

5 It is worth noting that the defendant, who was becoming increasingly irrelevant in the
6 gaming world, profits from the very existence of this lawsuit and the resulting attention by the
7 press. On the other hand, plaintiff, an individual, must continue to fight to clear his name, with the
8 financial burden of doing so constantly increasing.

9 This delay was further pointed out in plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s third request for
10 extension in the court of appeal. The delays caused by defendant worked a severe economic
11 burden considering the motion for undertaking, which defendant would not release pending
12 decision on appeal.

13 The courts of appeal are sensitive to the burdens and costs associated with meritless anti-
14 SLAPP motions. “Another appeal in an anti-SLAPP case. Another appeal by a defendant whose
15 anti-SLAPP motion failed below. Another appeal that, assuming it has no merit, will result in an
16 inordinate delay of the plaintiff’s case and cause him to incur more unnecessary attorney fees.”
17 (*Moriarty v. Laramar Management Corp.* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 125, 128.) This intentional
18 delay and these ‘strategic’ tactics have already worked an unfair burden on a plaintiff attempting
19 to have his case properly heard, and has increased his legal fees based on defendant’s continued
20 pursuit of a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion and appeal. Plaintiff should be awarded his attorney
21 fees in defending against the anti-SLAPP proceedings, while he awaits his case being resolved.

22 **III. Under the Lodestar Method, Plaintiff May Recover The Reasonable Market Value**
23 **for Attorneys’ Services**

24 Plaintiff is entitled to recover the “reasonable market value” of his attorneys’ services. The
25 proper measure of this value is the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the market. And the court
26 must apply the market rate, regardless of whether the attorneys have charged their client the full
27 market rate for their services, a discounted below-market rate, or have represented their client pro
28 bono and free of charge. (*Syers Properties III v. Rankin* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 701; *Chacon*

1 v. *Litke* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260; *Nemecek & Cole v. Horn*, 208 Cal.App.4th at 652.)

2 Courts have repeatedly held that an award of attorney’s fees is not limited to a volume-
3 discounted “insurance” rate. Rather the proper measure of fees is the “reasonable rate” within the
4 community. (*Nemecek & Cole v. Horn* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 641, 652.) In this case, an award of
5 fees and costs is mandatory upon a finding of frivolousness or purpose of delay. (CCP § 425.16(c)(1).)
6 Moreover, section 425.16 has been interpreted to mean all fees and costs associated with the preparation
7 of an anti-SLAPP motion. (*Dove Audio v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785
8 [affirming award of \$27,000 after granting a special motion to strike]; *Church of Scientology v.*
9 *Wollersheim* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 658-659 [affirming an award of more than \$130,000 in
10 attorneys’ fees and costs after granting a special motion to strike].)

11 Generally, hours considered spent on an anti-SLAPP motion is construed broadly. This
12 includes not only briefing and preparation in support of the anti-SLAPP motion, but also briefing
13 and research done in connection with the fee motion. (See *Ketchum*, 24 Cal. 4th at 1141 (“[A]n
14 award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also
15 the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees under Code of Civil Procedure section
16 425.16.”); *Blackburn v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc.*, No. 11-cv-01298, 2012 WL 1067632, at 2 (N.D.
17 Cal. Feb. 24, 2012) (reciting the *Ketchum* rule).

18 **IV. The Declaration of Counsel is Sufficient Evidence**

19 For the purposes of establishing the hours billed and fees incurred, “[a]n attorney’s testimony
20 as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in
21 the absence of detailed time records.” (*Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co.* (2000) 79
22 Cal.App.4th 285, 293; *Martino v. Denevi* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.)

23 The trial court must apply a lodestar approach (i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended
24 multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate in the community for similar work) in setting a fee award
25 under Section 425.16. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1136.) This lodestar amount may
26 be adjusted by such factors as the moving party’s attorney’s experience and abilities and the novelty
27 and difficulty of the issues involved in the motion. (*Id.* at p. 1132-1133.)

28 “Under *Serrano III*, the lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in

1 the community; it may be adjusted by the court [using a multiplier] based on
2 factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
3 involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the
4 nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the
5 contingent nature of the fee award. (*Serrano III, supra*, 20 Cal. 3d at p. 49.) The
6 purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular
7 action.” (*Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

8 “In *Serrano IV*, applying the same principles to the statutory fee award under Code
9 of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, we reiterated that fee awards should be fully
10 compensatory. We approved the calculation of attorney fees beginning with a
11 lodestar figure based on the reasonable hours spent, multiplied by the hourly
12 prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community conducting *noncontingent*
13 litigation of the same type. (*Serrano IV, supra*, 32 Cal. 3d at p. 625.) We remarked
14 that the reasonable value of attorney services is variously defined as the “hourly
15 amount to which attorneys of like skill in the area would typically be entitled.”
16 (*Id.* at p. 640, fn. 31; see also *id.* at p. 643 [“Services compensable under [Code of
17 Civil Procedure] section 1021.5 are computed from their reasonable market
18 value’].)” (*Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)

19 Here, the attorneys who analyzed the case and the pleadings, gathered, and reviewed the
20 relevant evidence, researched, and drafted the opposition and sur-reply to the anti-SLAPP motion,
21 reviewed and responded to defendant’s appellate arguments, wrote an answer to defendant’s
22 petition for review in the California Supreme Court, and prepared the present attorney’s fees
23 motion, all have extensive experience in the practice of law related to tort law, appellate practice,
24 and anti-SLAPP issues. The degree of complexity was high and the records voluminous.
25 Compared to more routine motions, anti-SLAPPs require a higher degree of academic precision to
26 understand, evaluate, and draft. They are time-consuming because they involve a Summary
27 Judgment component.

28 The Summary Judgment aspect involves a high level of detail, facts, evidence, and analysis
relating to plaintiff’s causes of action in light of defendant’s presented arguments and supporting
evidence, but without the benefit of discovery. Counsel had to research and analyze issues relating
to defamation, as well as complex and specialized anti-SLAPP issues relating to the very involved
history of plaintiff and defendant’s relationship, and defendant’s alleged defenses under the anti-
SLAPP statute. Counsel had to interview the client and gather supporting evidence.

Finally, the loss of a complex anti-SLAPP motion involves a high degree of financial risk,

1 because there is no guarantee that the Court will agree with plaintiff’s analysis of the legal issues,
2 and a prevailing defendant is entitled to mandatory attorney fees. Plaintiff’s counsel was successful
3 based ultimately on showing the potential of prevailing on the merits of this case, in both the trial
4 court and on appeal.

5 In addition, while defendant has delayed this case, plaintiff has had to post a substantial
6 undertaking solely to retain his rights to seek proper redress of his defamation and false light claims,
7 after already facing tremendous loss prior to the filing of this lawsuit based on defendant’s actions
8 (and thus the basis of this case). “And we affirm with the observation that, however efficacious the
9 anti-SLAPP procedure may be in the right case, it can be badly abused in the wrong one, resulting
10 in substantial cost-and prejudicial delay. It is time for plaintiff’s case to be heard on the merits.”
11 (*Grewal v. Jammu* (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 980-981.) Plaintiff deserves his day in court
12 without resorting to tactics that unnecessarily attempt to pressure him to give up his meritorious
13 claims. Plaintiff has spent a year and a half focusing on opposing defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion
14 which has repeatedly been denied, all while having to take on a significant financial burden, solely
15 so that he can be heard and have his day in court.

16 As such, the Court should award Defendants and their counsel a .50 X multiplier to
17 compensate them for the complexity of the matter, the risk of potential failure, the excessive delay
18 by defendant, the quality of the legal work performed, and the degree of success achieved.

19 **V. PLAINTIFF'S' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE UNDER CALIFORNIA**
20 **LAW**

21 The total amount of fees requested by Plaintiff is reasonable in terms of the blended billable
22 rate of \$600 and the total time billed of 356.5 hours (of which 10 hours are anticipated to be billed
23 to review the Opposition and draft the Reply to this Motion for Fees). California appellate courts,
24 both state and federal, have routinely awarded fee amounts in the range requested. Although some
25 of the following opinions are unpublished, they are cited not as binding precedent, but as examples
26 of fee awards deemed reasonable for a prevailing party on anti-SLAPP motions. This shows that
27 Plaintiff’s fee request is reasonable and “in the ballpark” given the difficulty and complexity of the
28 motion.

1 Courts consider fee applications ““on [their] own merits . . . taking into account what is
2 reasonable under the circumstances.”” (*Graham-Sult*, 756 F.3d at 751-52 (citing *Premier Med.*
3 *Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass’n*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 561 (2008)) (rejecting an
4 argument that fees were unreasonable because the award was greater than fees other courts awarded
5 to successful anti-SLAPP defendants in other cases).

6 The lodestar amount requested is well within the range of fees other courts have found
7 reasonable. In *Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 658-659, the Second
8 District affirmed an award of \$130,506.71 in attorneys’ fees and costs on a special motion to strike. (See
9 also, e.g., *Graham-Sult v. Clainos* (2014) 756 F.3d at 751 (affirming an award of \$240,506 for an
10 anti-SLAPP motion and attorney’s fee motion eight years ago); *Metabolife Intern., Inc. v. Wornick*
11 (2002) 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220 at 1228 (awarding \$318,687 under section 425.16 twenty years ago);
12 *Vargas v. City of Salinas* (2011) 200 Cal. App. 4th 1331, 1338, (affirming award of \$226,928 under
13 section 425.16 eleven years ago).)

14 The 356.5 hours spent working on these anti-SLAPP related tasks are prima facie reasonable.
15 Courts have found similar amounts of hours reasonable in other cases. (See, e.g., *Premier Med.*
16 *Mgmt. Sys.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 560, 565 (finding 345 hours spent by counsel working on a joint
17 motion to strike was reasonable); *Open Source Security, Inc. v. Perens*, No. 17-cv-04002, 2018 WL
18 2762637, at 7 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2018) (granting fees for 446 hours, including for motions to strike
19 and other briefs.) Here, counsel expended only the number of hours necessary to preserve Plaintiff’s
20 rights. Counsel should be compensated for the total hours requested.

21 Plaintiff requests a blended billing rate of \$600 an hour, which is well within the range of
22 rates that courts have deemed reasonable, especially in the Los Angeles market. (See, e.g.: *Universal*
23 *Elecs., Inc. v. Univ. Remote Control, Inc.*, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1337 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining
24 certain “partners at major law firms” billed up to \$1,100 per hour seven years ago); *Hill v. Berryhill*,
25 No. 16-2426, 2018 WL 4039912, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018) (finding an hourly rate of \$1,067
26 reasonable); *Max Sound Corp. v. Google, Inc.*, No. 14-cv-04412, 2017 WL 4536342, at 12 (N.D.
27 Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (holding rates up to \$950 per hour were “in line with the billing rates for
28 attorneys with similar qualifications” in the area five years ago); *Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation*

1 SKG Inc., No. 14-cv-04062, 2017 WL 2423161, at 9 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2017) (finding rates between
2 \$870 and \$1,200 per hour for senior attorneys “fair and reasonable” five years ago); *ScriptsAmerica,*
3 *Inc. v. Ironridge Global LLC*, No. 14-03962, 2016 WL 6871280, at 5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016)
4 (granting fees based upon \$950 per hour for partners, \$700 per hour for associates, and \$350 per
5 hour for paralegals at Gibson Dunn six years ago); *In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.*, No.
6 11-cv-02509, 2015 WL 5158730, at 9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (awarding, for the years 2011
7 through 2015, partner rates up to \$975 per hour, non-partner attorney rates up to \$800 per hour, and
8 paralegal rates up to \$430 per hour); *Wynn v. Chanos*, No. 14-cv-04329, 2015 WL 3832561, at 2
9 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2015) (finding a rate of \$1,085 per hour for a partner and \$710 per hour for
10 associates reasonable seven years ago); *Masimo Corp v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P.*, No. 02-
11 4770, 2007 WL 5279897 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007) (finding \$1,000 per hour reasonable for a partner
12 fourteen years ago).

13 As can be seen above, \$600 as an hourly rate is more than reasonable considering the
14 experience of counsel involved, in the Los Angeles market, and the results achieved.

15 **VI. Defendant and Their Counsel are Jointly and Severally Liable**

16 Defendant and their counsel should be held jointly and severally liable for paying Plaintiff’s
17 fees and costs. Defendant’s counsel should have weighed the risks of filing an unmeritorious anti-
18 SLAPP motion, followed by an unmeritorious appeal, and further, a petition for review, and should
19 have disclosed those risks to their clients, along with the financial consequences of losing the anti-
20 SLAPP motion. Defense counsel is at fault, along with his client, for filing the motion and then
21 appeal on an unmeritorious anti-SLAPP motion.

22 Cal. Civ. Pro. Sec. 425.16(c)(1) does not limit who must pay Plaintiff’s fees and does not
23 prohibit the trial court from holding defendant’s counsel jointly and severally liable to pay Plaintiff’s
24 fees. CCP §§ 128.5, 128.7, 396b (b), 1021.4, and 1021.5, expressly provides for payment to be
25 made by the losing party or its counsel. CCP §§ 396b (b), 2023.010, 2031.310, all show the
26 Legislature’s intent that under the Code of Civil Procedure there are always two parties who are
27 liable to pay fees -- the losing party and his counsel. This is because they may be jointly responsible
28 for causing harm to the prevailing party in the instant action.

1 In contrast to the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Code contains attorney’s fees provisions
2 that compensate prevailing parties for harm caused by the losing party, but not by counsel. This is
3 because violations of the Civil Code are typically committed by the client, long before any attorneys
4 have been hired. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, attorney’s fees provisions typically prohibit
5 counsel from filing frivolous pleadings or raising frivolous objections. If counsel makes procedural
6 decisions that harm the prevailing party, then counsel are equally liable to pay fees to compensate
7 for that procedural harm. The anti-SLAPP statute is a procedural statute that requires both the losing
8 party and their counsel to pay fees.

9 Comparable statutes in the Code of Civil Procedure show that where the attorneys’ decision to
10 file a pleading causes harm, a trial court does have discretion to order counsel to pay fees. For example,
11 CCP § 396b (b) provides that:

12 (b) In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of
13 reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in making or resisting the motion
14 to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs
15 of action.

16 In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall
17 take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was
18 reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was
19 made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting
20 the venue knew or should have known.

21 As between the party and his or her attorney, those expenses and fees shall be the
22 personal liability of the attorney not chargeable to the party. Sanctions shall not be
23 imposed pursuant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party’s papers,
24 or on the court’s own noticed motion, and after opportunity to be heard.

25 The California Legislature made it clear in section 396b (b) that when a prevailing party on
26 a motion to transfer venue is awarded his attorney’s fees, there are two parties who may normally
27 be held liable – the client who caused the Complaint to be filed and the attorney who filed it in the
28 wrong venue. But because venue is a complex legal issue, exclusively within the attorney’s
professional knowledge, fees should be paid only by the attorney, even though the client would
normally be jointly responsible.

Similarly, CCP §§ 2031.310 and 2023.010 make it clear that under the discovery statutes,
both a losing party and its counsel may be held liable for paying monetary sanctions. It is mandatory
for the court to award sanctions, but the court has discretion whether to impose sanctions on the

1 losing party or their counsel. Under the discovery statutes, both the losing party and/or its counsel
2 may have engaged in misconduct that caused harm to the prevailing party. Thus, section 2031.310
3 (h) provides that:

4 Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction
5 under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or
6 attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response
to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial
justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

7 Because lawyers know the rules of discovery and civil procedure, but clients generally do
8 not, lawyers can be held responsible for abusing the discovery rules. For example, lawyers may fail
9 to meet and confer, may raise frivolous objections, or may use discovery methods to annoy,
10 embarrass, or oppress. Thus, under the Code of Civil Procedure, the California Legislature has
11 stated its intent that lawyers shall be held liable to pay attorney’s fees if their procedural misconduct
12 causes harm.

13 Section 1987.2 (a) deals with motions to enforce subpoenas. It provides that the court may
14 impose sanctions on one who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to enforce a subpoena.
15 Like section 425.16 (c)(1), section 1987.2 (a) is silent as to whether fees may be awarded only
16 against the client, or against the client and counsel jointly. But section 1987.2 (a) is slightly different
17 in that it requires a showing that the losing party or attorney acted in bad faith or without substantial
18 justification.

19 Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made
20 under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its
21 discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or
22 opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the
motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that
one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.

23 If attorneys are not required to pay fees, they can file unmeritorious anti-SLAPP pleadings
24 with impunity. This would give attorneys a perverse incentive to shoot the moon, because clients
25 would foot the bill for the attorney’s frivolous filing. The attorney is better situated than the client
26 to draft a proper pleading that is meritorious.

27 As a matter of public policy, clients and attorneys bear equal responsibility for filing
28 frivolous strike motions. Cal. Civ. Pro. Sec. 425.16(c)(1) does not exempt client or counsel from

1 paying fees. To effectuate the purpose of discouraging motions which are frivolous or meant for
2 delay, thereby with the intention to pressure a plaintiff to abandon their right to be heard, both client
3 and counsel must pay.

4 In order to secure his rights to be heard by discouraging unmeritorious delay, plaintiff's fees
5 should be paid in this case.

6 **VII. CONCLUSION**

7 Denying the anti-SLAPP motion and awarding plaintiff the full market value of his
8 attorney's fees is the only way to prevent injustice, to relieve plaintiff of a crushing financial burden,
9 and to protect plaintiff against unfair tactics meant to make litigation too burdensome to continue.

10 Therefore, Plaintiff asks that the trial court award attorney's fees in the lodestar amount of
11 \$203,945 in attorney's fees, plus a .50 multiplier of \$21,480, plus \$598.96 in costs, for a total award
12 and judgment of \$226,014.96, and order Defendant and his counsel, jointly and severally, to pay
13 this amount to Plaintiff's counsel within 30 days after the motion is granted.

14 DATED: February 8, 2022

**MANNING & KASS
ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP**



15
16
17
18 By: _____
19 ANTHONY J. ELLROD
20 Attorneys for Plaintiff
21 William J. Mitchell
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 801 S. Figueroa St, 15th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017-3012.

On February 8, 2022, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** on the interested parties in this action as follows:

David Tashroudian, Esq. Mona Tashroudian, Esq. TASHROUDIAN LAW GROUP, APC 12400 Ventura Blvd. Suite 300 Studio City, CA 91604 Telephone: (818) 561-7381 Facsimile: (818) 561-7381 Email: david@tashlawgroup.com Email: mona@tashlawgroup.com	Attorney for Defendants Twin Galaxies
---	--

BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the practice of Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope was placed in the mail at Los Angeles, California.

ONLY BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: Only by emailing the document(s) to the persons at the e-mail address(es). This is necessitated during the declared National Emergency due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic because this office will be working remotely, not able to send physical mail as usual, and is therefore using only electronic mail. No electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful was received within a reasonable time after the transmission. We will provide a physical copy, upon request only, when we return to the office at the conclusion of the National Emergency.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

1 Executed on February 8, 2022, at Los Angeles, California.
2
3
4



5 _____
6 Angela Thompson
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

MANNING & KASS
ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW



Court Reservation Receipt

Reservation	
Reservation ID: 930998964344	Status: RESERVED
Reservation Type: Motion for Attorney Fees	Number of Motions: 1
Case Number: 19STCV12592	Case Title: WILLIAM JAMES MITCHELL vs TWIN GALEXIES, LLC
Filing Party: William James Mitchell (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 36
Date/Time: April 5th 2022, 8:30AM	Confirmation Code: CR-UM59S8WIYFWVDJRM

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion for Attorney Fees	60.00	1	60.00
Credit Card Percentage Fee (2.75%)	1.65	1	1.65
TOTAL			\$61.65

Payment	
Amount: \$61.65	Type: MasterCard
Account Number: XXXX6677	Authorization: 017843

[◀ Back to Main](#) [Print Page](#)